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HELEN A. ANDERSON*
The Freedom to Speak and the
Freedom to Listen: The
Admissibility of the Criminal
Defendant’s Taste in
Entertainment
History is filled with examples of an older generation re-coiling at the cultural tastes of the young.  Jazz, rock’n’roll,
and even the waltz1 were viewed with horror by elders when
these art forms first became popular.  During the recent past,
emerging popular music, movies, and video games have been
held responsible for inspiring everything from minor juvenile de-
linquency to mass murder—at least in the eyes of some segments
of the public and the media.
Legal efforts against the makers and distributors of such en-
tertainment, however, have been held in check by the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech.2  For the most part,
courts have rebuffed attempts to hold writers, artists, producers,
and other makers of music, movies, games, or books civilly liable
for criminal actions linked to these cultural products.  For exam-
ple, defendants prevailed on summary judgment when the par-
ents of a teenage suicide victim sued rocker Ozzy Osbourne for
* Senior Lecturer, University of Washington School of Law.  I am indebted to my
former student, Lisa Rickenberg, whose independent study paper inspired this arti-
cle.  Lisa drew my attention to a number of cases discussed here.  She was concerned
about police targeting of suspects for cultural reasons—because of the music they
listened to, or the alternative culture clothing they might be wearing.
1 See the references to the controversy inspired by the waltz at Lori Heikkila,
Waltz , at  http://www.centralhome.com/ballroomcountry/waltz.htm (last visited Jan.
5, 2005); Bob January, The Waltz , at  http://www.bobjanuary.com/waltz.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 5, 2005).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2.
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causing their child’s death with lyrics about suicide.3  Similarly,
the makers of the movie Natural Born Killers  defeated an at-
tempt to hold them liable for the murder of a teenage girl by
boys said to be imitating the film.4  Producers and sellers of art
and entertainment are not liable for the actions of those who
consume their products.  For similar reasons, legislative efforts to
restrict these producers and sellers have also foundered in the
courts.5
But courts have not been so solicitous of the First Amendment
rights of those who make up the audience for these works.  Evi-
dence that the defendant viewed the movie Natural Born Killers
has been introduced in a number of murder trials.  In these and
other criminal cases, courts have allowed evidence of the defen-
dant’s viewing or listening habits to show motive, intent, state of
mind, or to support an aggravating factor at sentencing.6  In such
cases the Constitution is rarely mentioned, even though the First
Amendment has been held to protect consumers as well as the
producers of First Amendment speech.7  And, while courts reject
a causal link between art and crime when artists or the entertain-
ment industry are civil defendants, the assumption of causation
seems to underlie the admission of viewing, reading, or listening
habits in criminal cases.
Why this seeming inconsistency in the protection of First
Amendment rights?  Is it an inconsistency?  Courts and commen-
tators are probably correct that allowing civil liability for the
criminal acts of third persons inspired by one’s artistic works
would lead to a chilling effect and self-censorship.  And, cer-
tainly, the First Amendment should not be an absolute bar to
relevant evidence in a criminal prosecution.  Nevertheless, the
difference in treatment of producers and consumers reveals an
ambivalence about some of the goods currently available in our
“marketplace of ideas.”  Producers have a right to market any-
thing, but consumers may be blamed for their choices.
Perhaps the difference is less about ambivalence and more
3 McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 188-89 (Ct. App. 1988).
4 Byers v. Edmondson, 2001-1184, 8-9 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/5/02), writ denied , 2002-
1811 (La. 10/4/02), 826 So. 2d 551, 557-58 (La. App. 2002); see generally NATURAL
BORN KILLERS (Warner 1994); and see infra  notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
5 See infra  Part I.B.
6 See infra  notes 92-107 and accompanying text.
7 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
756-57 (1976).
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about the different legal resources available to producers and
criminal defendant consumers.  The lawyers for entertainment
defendants in civil suits always make strenuous First Amendment
arguments, but criminal defense attorneys seem rarely to raise a
constitutional objection to evidence of their clients’ consumption
of First Amendment works.  If they object, it is on grounds of
relevance, undue prejudice, or for some other evidentiary rea-
son.8  The standard for relevance is fairly low, and trial courts are
usually given wide discretion to make determinations of rele-
vance and prejudice.9  This failure to make the constitutional ar-
guments may be due simply to a lack of awareness or because the
law in this area is underdeveloped.  It may also be due to the
heavy caseloads and low pay of many public defenders—factors
which can lead to poor representation of criminal defendants.  In
our adversarial system, if the constitutional objections are not
raised, the courts cannot rule on them.10  Thus, a difference in
the quality of lawyering may be what has lead to the different
treatment of First Amendment consumers and producers in the
courts.
At the very least, lawyers and courts should be aware of this
apparent inconsistency and press judges to consider the criminal
defendant’s First Amendment rights when determining whether
to admit evidence about the defendant’s taste in movies or music.
There is a very real danger that defendants will be prejudiced,
even wrongfully convicted, because of jurors’ hostility towards
certain music, movies, books, or other cultural trappings.  And, if
some works are admitted as “criminal” or “depraved,” courts will
begin the slide down the slippery slope of judging the content of
8 FED. R. EVID. 401-03 and the state versions of these rules.  Occasionally, the
evidence is introduced and objected to under FED. R. EVID. 404(b) or its state
counterpart.
9 Federal Rule of Evidence 401’s definition of relevance, upon which most state
court rules are based, favors broad admissibility and establishes a low threshold of
relevance. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 1 FEDERAL EVI-
DENCE 391-92 (2d ed. 1994).  Review of a relevance determination is often deferen-
tial.  Peter Nicolas, De Novo Review in Deferential Robes?:  A Deconstruction of the
Standard of Review of Evidentiary Errors in the Federal System , 54 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 531, 540-42 (2004).  Professor Nicolas notes that de novo  review of a relevancy
determination is appropriate where the dispute involves the materiality prong of
relevance, but that a more deferential review of the probative worth prong makes
sense, especially when a balancing of prejudice under Rule 403 is also involved. Id .
at 542.  The criminal cases under discussion in this article do not make these distinc-
tions. See infra  Part III.
10 U.S. v. Lazarus, 425 F.2d 638, 642-44 (9th Cir. 1970).
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First Amendment material.  In addition, the potential for a chil-
ling effect on listeners’ rights under the First Amendment is very
real, as consumers may fear that their listening, viewing, or read-
ing habits may make them targets of law enforcement.  This fear
may be amplified by the knowledge that such habits are now eas-
ily tracked through commercial records, such as credit card
records or online shopping records.  Thus, criminal defense attor-
neys need to be alert to the constitutional implications of con-
sumption evidence, and there needs to be a clearer, more
restrictive framework for the admission of such evidence in crim-
inal trials.
In Part I of this Article, I will establish that the First Amend-
ment protects both consumers and producers of expression, al-
though the scope of consumer protection has not been greatly
elaborated.  Part II discusses attempts to hold the entertainment
industry liable for crimes by third persons, as well as legislative
efforts to restrict or ban certain kinds of entertainment or art
deemed to cause violence.  For the most part, these efforts
against producers have failed.  Part III then shows how a criminal
defendant’s viewing, listening, or reading habits may be used as
evidence against that defendant, and that the constitutional im-
plications of such evidence are rarely discussed.  Part IV looks at
the analogous issue of First Amendment associational evidence
in criminal cases, showing that while the Supreme Court has es-
tablished that such evidence may violate the Constitution, the
lower courts have collapsed the constitutional question into one
of relevance with a loose, discretionary standard of review.  Part
V discusses whether the apparently disparate treatment of con-
sumers and producers under the First Amendment is really an
inconsistency, and examines several counterarguments.  Part VI
then recommends a change in the approach to admission of evi-
dence of consumption of entertainment or art in criminal trials.
The showing of relevancy should be more rigorous, the standard
of review should be less deferential, and the harmless-error anal-
ysis should be appropriate for a constitutional error.
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I
THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS BOTH
PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS OF CULTURE
The First Amendment11 protects political and non-political ex-
pression, including writing, film, art, and music.12  First Amend-
ment protection is not weaker if such expression “takes on an
unpopular or even dangerous viewpoint.”13  This protection ap-
plies to both speakers and listeners—or producers and consum-
ers of expression.14
A. Producers
The scope of First Amendment protection for speakers and
other producers of cultural expression has been fairly well de-
fined.  Although its approach has evolved,15 the Supreme Court
has made clear that the First Amendment protects producers of
speech unless that speech falls into certain categories: “‘Fighting
words,’ obscenity, defamation, commercial speech, and speech
likely to incite imminent lawless action.”16  This Article is con-
11 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant
part that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses have been
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to apply to
state and local government entities and officials. See  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925).
12 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (regarding music);
Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 569 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[M]usical
expression, like other forms of entertainment, is a matter of [F]irst [A]mendment
concern.”).
13 Torries v. Hebert, 111 F. Supp. 2d 806, 809-10 (W.D. La. 2000) (enjoining crimi-
nal prosecution of skating rink owners for playing “gangster rap” at skating events).
14 Throughout this Article, I often refer to these two groups as producers and
consumers (of First Amendment expression).  I sometimes use the terms “speakers”
and “listeners.”  These terms are meant to include producers and consumers of writ-
ing, music, or visual entertainment or art, just as “speech” under the First Amend-
ment includes all artistic or political expression. Cinevision Corp. , 745 F.2d at 569
(“[A]ll—political and non-political—musical expression, like other forms of en-
tertainment, is a matter of [F]irst [A]mendment concern.”).
15 Compare, e.g. , Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding conspiracy con-
viction for a man who handed out anti-draft leaflets) and  Debs v. U.S., 249 U.S. 211
(1919) (upholding conviction of socialist candidate who expressed support for those
convicted of obstructing military recruitment) with  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) (striking down a statute that punished advocacy of violent means to
achieve industrial or political reform).
16 Karl A. Menninger II, Cause of Action Against Producer, Artist, Publisher or
Author for Violence Incited by a Movie, Song or Book , 20 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 1,
§ 17 (2003).  “The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain cate-
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cerned primarily with speech that could be alleged to inspire vio-
lence against third parties, and therefore the exception for
incitement is most relevant here.17
The definition of incitement was laid down in Brandenburg v.
Ohio  as “advocacy [directed] to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action.”18
There, the Court reversed the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan
member for advocating violence.  At the Klan’s invitation, a local
television reporter filmed a Ku Klux Klan rally at which mem-
bers made statements such as, “[I]f our President, our Congress,
our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian
race, it’s possible that there might have to be some revengeance
taken.”19  The Court held that, under the circumstances, such a
statement amounted to only “abstract teaching” of racist vio-
lence.  The Court distinguished between “mere advocacy” and
advocacy of immediate, specific action.20 “Mere” or “abstract”
advocacy is protected speech.21
The Court elaborated on the incitement test in Hess v. Indi-
ana ,22 where it reversed a conviction for disorderly conduct when
the circumstances of the defendant’s speech did not show advo-
cacy of imminent lawless action.  The defendant had said during
gories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography pro-
duced with real children.”  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245-246
(2002).
17 Fighting words are defined as “those which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).  The exception seems intended for speech that is likely to
provoke violence against the speaker, rather than third persons. See  Menninger,
supra  note 16, § 18; Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., No. Civ.A. V-94-006, 1997 WL
405907 at *18 (S.D. Tex. March 31, 1997).  Some litigants have argued that exces-
sively violent works may be obscene, but courts have responded that the obscenity
exception to the First Amendment applies only to sexual imagery, not violence. See,
e.g. , James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002); Pahler v. Slayer,
No. CV 79356, 2001 WL 1736476 at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 2001); Byers v.
Edmondson, 2001-1184, 8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/5/02), writ denied , 2002-1811 (La. 10/4/
02), 826 So. 2d 551, 557 (La. App. 2002).  The standard of less First Amendment
protection applied to commercial speech would only be relevant to this discussion if
the speech alleged to cause violence were part of an advertisement. See, e.g. , Sakon
v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1989) (finding only limited First Amendment
protection for defendant when teenage plaintiff sued after being injured while imi-
tating a stunt he saw in a soft drink commercial).
18 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
19 Brandenburg , 395 U.S. at 446.
20 Id . at 449.
21 Id .; see also McCoy v. Stewart , 282 F.3d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 2002).
22 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
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an anti-war demonstration, after police had moved protesters out
of the street, “We’ll take the fucking street later.”23  Witnesses
testified that he “did not appear to be exhorting the crowd to go
back into the street, that he was facing the crowd and not the
street when he uttered the statement, that his statement did not
appear to be addressed to any particular person or group.”24  Cit-
ing the Brandenburg  test, the Court held that the statement was
not incitement because it did not advocate immediate action and
was not directed to any person or group of persons.25  The Court
also stated, “And since there was no evidence or rational infer-
ence from the import of the language, that his words were in-
tended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder,
those words could not be punished by the State on the ground
that they had ‘a tendency to lead to violence.’”26  Thus, a ten-
dency for speech to cause crime is not enough to overcome First
Amendment protection.
The holdings of Brandenburg  and Hess  form the basis of most
First Amendment rulings in favor of cultural producers whose
works are alleged to have caused violence to third parties.27  The
scope of First Amendment protection for producers of cultural
expression appears to be the same in criminal or civil cases.28
B. Consumers
The Court has recognized that the freedom to communicate
ideas, in whatever form, requires a freedom to receive those
ideas.  It has recognized the rights of “listeners” or consumers of
speech, in “[only] a few relatively unusual cases.”29  Thus, the
23 Id . at 107.
24 Id .
25 Id . at 108-09.
26 Id . at 109 (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 260 Ind. 427, 429 (1973)).
27 Although Brandenburg  and Hess  were criminal cases, the Supreme Court has
used the Brandenburg  formulation to reverse a civil judgment.  NAACP v. Clai-
borne Hardward Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928-29 (1982).
28 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).  For a discussion question-
ing this symmetry, see  Rodney A. Smolla, The First Amendment and New Forms of
Civil Liability , 88 VA. L. REV. 919 (2002) (book review).
29 Bernard W. Bell, Filth, Filtering and the First Amendment: Ruminations on Pub-
lic Libraries’ Use of Internet Filtering Software , 53 FED. COMM. L. J. 191, 207 (2001);
see also  Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 767-770 (1972) (upholding denial of
visa for communist speaker but recognizing First Amendment rights of those who
sought to hear him); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (invalidating prison
mail censorship as violative of non-prisoner recipient’s rights to receive mail).
Procunier  was substantially overruled in Thornburgh v. Abbott , 490 U.S. 401 (1989),
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scope of these rights is not as well defined as those of “speakers”
or producers of speech.  Nevertheless, it is clear that such rights
exist.
“Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker.  But where
a speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to
the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”30  In
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council , the Court recognized the constitutional right of consum-
ers to receive commercial information about drug prices.  In that
case, consumer groups challenged a Virginia law that prohibited
pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs.
The Court found that such advertising was protected commercial
speech, and that consumers had a “reciprocal right to receive the
advertising.”31
The Court in Virginia State Board  relied in part on Lamont v.
Postmaster General ,32 a 1965 case that recognized the public’s
right to receive and read material without government interfer-
ence or monitoring.  There, the Court struck down a statute re-
quiring the post office to destroy unsealed mail determined to be
communist political propaganda from foreign countries unless
the addressee returned a reply card indicating the desire to re-
ceive the mail.33  The Court found an “unconstitutional abridg-
ment of the addressee’s First Amendment rights.”34
Although the statute at issue in Lamont  did nothing directly to
punish those who requested their mail, the Court noted the law’s
although not for its recognition of addressees’ First Amendment rights. See  Tat-
tered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1051-52 (Colo. 2002) (discussing
First Amendment rights of booksellers and their customers).
30 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
756 (1976).
31 Id . at 757.
32 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
33 Id . at 306-07.
34 Id . at 307.  Concurring, Justice Brennan emphasized,
It is true that the First Amendment contains no specific guarantee of access
to publications.  However, the protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond
the specific guarantees to protect from congressional abridgment those
equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the express guaran-
tees fully meaningful . . . .  I think the right to receive publications is such a
fundamental right.  The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if
otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them.  It
would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.
Id . at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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inhibition on the free exercise of First Amendment rights.  The
Court reasoned that the law
is almost certain to have a deterrent effect, especially as re-
spects those who have sensitive positions.  Their livelihood
may be dependent on a security clearance.  Public officials like
schoolteachers who have no tenure, might think they would
invite disaster if they read what the Federal Government says
contains the seeds of treason.  Apart from them, any ad-
dressee is likely to feel some inhibition in sending for litera-
ture which federal officials have condemned as “communist
political propaganda.”35
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan emphasized that even
minor intrusions on the recipients’ rights could have a significant
effect on the exercise of those rights.36
The Court has given special recognition to the consumer’s First
Amendment rights in the context of pornography.  In Stanley v.
Georgia ,37 the Court struck down a state obscenity statute that
made private possession of obscene material a crime.  The Court
relied on the “well established” point that the Constitution pro-
tects the “right to receive information and ideas, regardless of
their social worth.”38  Although Stanley  has been construed nar-
rowly in later decisions to allow regulation of obscene material
outside the home,39 the Court continues to cite it when discussing
First Amendment issues.40
Lower courts have recognized the First Amendment rights of
consumers of expression. Lamont  was cited to support the
35 Id . at 307.
36 Justice Brennan wrote:
[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that
way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes
of procedure.  This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that consti-
tutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liber-
ally construed.  A close and literal construction deprives them of half their
efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted
more in sound than in substance.  It is the duty of courts to be watchful for
the constitutional rights of the citizens, and against any stealthy encroach-
ments thereon.
Id . at 309-10 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
635 (1886)).
37 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
38 Id . at 564.
39 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108 (1990); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139,
141-43 (1973).
40 See, e.g ., United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 216 (2003) (Breyer,
J., concurring); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 236 (2002).
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standing of library patrons challenging library restrictions on In-
ternet access.41  Standing has also been given to potential recipi-
ents of speech to challenge a judicial gag order.42  Similarly,
striking down a city ordinance limiting access of minors to violent
video games, Judge Posner relied in part on the First Amend-
ment rights of minors who might want to play the games.43
Although courts have clearly recognized that the First Amend-
ment protects consumers as well as producers of expression, they
have not elaborated greatly on the extent of those rights.  The
analytical framework worked out for producers or “speakers” is
not always appropriate for consumers or “listeners.”44  Listeners,
for example, might be more interested in access to and choice of
information, while speakers might be interested in monopolizing
access or overcoming listeners’ reluctance to listen.45  Courts
have yet to fully define the interests of listeners, especially when
not derived from the interests of speakers.  This lack of elabora-
tion may be one reason for the unequal treatment of producers
and consumers in the courts.
Outside of particular cases, there also seems to be strong senti-
ment that the First Amendment protects the rights of a listening,
viewing, or reading audience.  Much of the criticism against parts
of the USA PATRIOT Act is based on this conviction.  Professor
David Cole has argued that the Act, which allows the Justice De-
partment to seize library and bookstore records, has “a substan-
tial chilling effect.”46  Similar First Amendment language has
been used by prominent civil libertarians and others.47  Although
41 Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Library, 2 F. Supp.  2d
783, 791, (E.D. Va. 1998).
42 See In re  Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 607 (2d Cir. 1988);
FOCUS v. Allegheny County Ct. of Com. Pl., 75 F.3d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 1996).
43 American Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
Judge Posner gave a policy argument in support of those rights:  “People are unlikely
to become well-functioning, independent-minded adults and responsible citizens if
they are raised in an intellectual bubble.” Id . at 577.
44 See  Bell, supra  note 29, at 206 (discussing appropriate analysis of library pa-
trons’ rights to receive information).  The author notes in this context the courts’
“failure to recognize that claims of people seeking information might differ from
those of speakers, and thus might require a different analysis.” Id .
45 The National Do Not Call List, for example, pits the interests of telemarketers
in speaking to anyone against the interests of telephone subscribers in stopping cer-
tain kinds of calls. See  F.T.C. v. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850 (10th
Cir. 2003).
46 Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Says It Has Not Used New Library Records Law , N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at A16.
47 Nadine Strossen, referring to the Justice Department’s authority under the PA-
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such statements are by no means the law, they show that the no-
tion of First Amendment protection for listeners is not an odd
legal technicality in a few court opinions, but an idea that has
intuitive appeal to many people.
II
PRODUCERS OF VIOLENT WORKS ARE USUALLY
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment rights of producers are more fully devel-
oped than those of consumers because those rights have been
frequently tested in the courts.  Over the years, attempts have
been made to show a causal link between certain art and crime.
There has long been some controversial evidence that violent im-
agery can cause violence.48  Youth music, especially, has been ac-
cused of causing crime.  Early rock’n’roll, the Beatles, and early
metal bands were all associated with crime when first intro-
TRIOT Act to look at library records, has stated:  “That is obviously something that,
if it became known to people who use libraries, would have an enormous chilling
effect.  Who wants to be reading with the government, in essence, looking over your
shoulder?”  Robert D. Richards, Nadine Strossen and Freedom of Expression:  A
Dialogue with the ACLU’s Top Card-Carrying Member , 13 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTS L.J. 185, 211 (2003). See  Alisa Solomon, Things We Lost in the Fire , VILLAGE
VOICE, Sept. 11, 2002, at 32. See also  Association of American Publishers, Freedom
to Read Committee, The Patriot Act and the First Amendment:  A Statement from the
Freedom to Read Committee of the Association of American Publishers:  Why the
Book Community Is Concerned , at  http://www.publishers. org/about/patriotact.pdf
(last visited Jan. 5, 2005) (“[T]he USA PATRIOT Act [Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Interrupt and Obstruct Ter-
rorism Act] . . . passed by Congress in the wake of the horrific events of September
11, 2001, contains provisions that threaten the First Amendment-protected activities
of book publishers, booksellers, librarians, and readers.”).  “If bookstore customers
and library patrons believe that government investigators can easily obtain their
records, they will stop reading works they fear may expose them to government
scrutiny.  [The PATRIOT Act] goes a long way to present this chilling effect on our
First Amendment rights.”  Letter from American Association of Publishers Presi-
dent Pat Schroeder to U.S. Senator Feingold (Aug. 6, 2003) available at  http://
www.publishers.org/govt/govtarticle.cfm? GovtArticleID=36  (last visited January 5,
2005).
48 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT:  ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION
ON PORNOGRAPHY 326 (GPO 1986).  The Commission concluded that substantial
exposure to sexually violent materials “bears a causal relationship to antisocial acts
of sexual violence.”  That conclusion was criticized, however. See  Anthony
D’Amato, A New Political Truth: Exposure to Sexually Violent Materials Causes Sex-
ual Violence , 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 575 (1990); Nadine Strossen, A Feminist
Critique of “The” Feminist Critique of Pornography , 79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1178-1180
(1993).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-3\ORE301.txt unknown Seq: 12 12-APR-05 10:48
910 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
duced.49  Rap and metal music have continued to come under
attack in recent years, as have some particularly violent video
games or movies, such as Natural Born Killers .  Yet, when legis-
lative bodies have sought to restrict or ban violent cultural prod-
ucts, their efforts have usually been found to run afoul of the
First Amendment for failure to show a compelling link between
the product and the feared harm: a “mere tendency” to en-
courage crime is not enough.50  Similarly, when crime victims
have sought civil redress against artists and producers of music,
movies, or games, attempting to show a connection between the
cultural/entertainment products and the crime, they have almost
always been unsuccessful because of First Amendment concerns.
The First Amendment issues have been treated as questions of
law.
A. Regulatory Efforts
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition , the Supreme Court re-
jected Congress’s effort to ban “virtual” child pornography—
pornography that was not made by exploiting minors, but which
appeared to involve underage children in pornographic scenes.
Relying on the Brandenburg  test, the Court found that Congress
had failed to show a real link between such pornography and
crimes against minors:
The government may not prohibit speech because it increases
the chance an unlawful act will be committed “at some indefi-
nite future time.”  The government may suppress speech for
advocating the use of force or a violation of law only if “such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”  There is
here no attempt, incitement, solicitation, or conspiracy.  The
Government has shown no more than a remote connection be-
tween speech that might encourage thoughts or impulses and
any resulting child abuse. Without a significantly stronger,
more direct connection, the Government may not prohibit
speech on the ground that it may encourage pedophiles to en-
49 See, e.g ., People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 129 (Ct. App. 1976) (noting
Charles Manson’s claim that he was inspired to murder partly by a Beatles song);
Ragan v. City of Seattle, 364 P.2d 916 (Wash. 1961) (upholding restrictions on juke-
boxes in recognition of the disruptive effect of rock-and-roll music); Richard Har-
rington, Bedeviling Rumors Heavy-Metal AC/DC Says It’s Not Satanic , WASH. POST,
November 20, 1985, available at  1985 WL 2083677 (noting pressure on AC/DC to
cancel tour when it was learned that it was the favorite band of Richard Ramirez,
“the Night Stalker”).
50 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
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gage in illegal conduct.51
The Court suggested that even if the government could show
that certain speech made crime more likely, the First Amend-
ment would shield such speech if it did not incite crime under the
Brandenburg  test:
The Government submits further that virtual child pornogra-
phy whets the appetites of pedophiles and encourages them to
engage in illegal conduct.  This rationale cannot sustain the
provision in question. The mere tendency of speech to en-
courage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it.
The government “cannot constitutionally premise legislation
on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.”
First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the gov-
ernment seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that
impermissible end.  The right to think is the beginning of free-
dom, and speech must be protected from the government be-
cause speech is the beginning of thought.52
Lower courts have also found a “mere tendency” to inspire
violence insufficient to justify restricting or banning violent prod-
ucts, most recently videogames.  Judge Posner, writing for the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in American Amusement Ma-
chine Association v. Kendrick , found that a video game trade as-
sociation was entitled to an injunction against enforcement of a
city ordinance limiting access of minors to violent video games.53
The court found that the city had failed to show a compelling
basis for the ordinance.
Since a tendency to cause crime is not enough to take a work
out of First Amendment protection, litigants attempting to over-
come the First Amendment would have to show a strong, clear,
causal link between a work and subsequent violence.54  In several
cases the courts have rejected efforts to justify legislation with
empirical evidence.  Judge Posner wrote in American Amusement
Machine , “[t]he studies do not find that video games have ever
caused anyone to commit a violent act, as opposed to feeling ag-
gressive, or have caused the average level of violence to increase
51 Id . at 253-54 (internal citations omitted).
52 Id . at 253 (internal citation omitted).
53 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).  A district court used similar reasoning to enjoin
enforcement of a Washington law penalizing distribution of certain video games to
minors. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng , 325 F. Supp 2d 1180 (W.D. Wash.
2004).
54 Ashcroft , 535 U.S. at 253.
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anywhere.”55  The court found the video games at issue to be no
more violent than television and movies also available to chil-
dren.  Similar reasoning underlies the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals’ decision in Interactive Digital Software Association v. St.
Louis County , which invalidated an ordinance that made it un-
lawful to make graphically violent video games available to mi-
nors.56  The court found a lack of solid empirical evidence that
video games are harmful or cause aggression and stated that a
general belief that violent video games are harmful is inadequate
to overcome constitutional concerns.57  Thus, in the context of
speech regulation, the courts are unwilling to assume what many
parents, educators, and legislators claim to “know”—that expo-
sure to depictions of violence will lead to violence.
In addressing challenges to legislative efforts to restrict First
Amendment expression, the courts treat the issue as a question
of law that can be resolved on summary judgment or other pre-
trial motion.  In both American Music Machine  and Interactive
Digital Software , the appellate courts applied strict scrutiny to
the challenged legislation in the context of reviewing the denial
of an injunction.58  The Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition , reviewing the reversal of a grant of summary judg-
ment, put a heavy burden on the government to show that the
statute at issue affected only work that fell outside First Amend-
ment protection.59  In these inquiries, there is no deference to the
trial court’s fact-finding expertise or discretion.
B. Civil Liability for Crimes by Consumers
For many of the same reasons that legislative efforts have
failed, suits by crime victims against cultural producers have
failed.  When victims of violence have sued entertainment indus-
try defendants alleging their products inspired the crimes, courts
have rejected tort claims on state law grounds, generally due to a
failure to show duty or causation.60  Courts have also relied heav-
55 244 F.3d at 578-79.
56 329 F.3d 954, 956-58 (8th Cir. 2003).
57 Id . at 958-59; see also Video Software Dealers Ass’n , 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1189
(finding no showing that videogames cause violence).
58 Interactive Digital Software Ass’n , 329 F.3d at 958. The American Amusement
Machine  court did not use the term “strict scrutiny,” but stated that to justify the
ordinance under the First Amendment required “compelling grounds” that were not
pretextual.  244 F.3d at 576.
59 535 U.S. at 246.
60 See  James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002); Sanders v. Ac-
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ily on the defendants’ protection under the First Amendment,
and First Amendment concerns usually play a part in the tort law
analysis of duty and causation.61  Courts have been attentive to
the likely chilling effect of civil liability on the arts and entertain-
ment industry, potential for self-censorship, and the difficulty of
defining “good” and “bad” art.
Attempts to hold artists and/or the entertainment industry lia-
ble for the crimes of their viewers or listeners are not new,62 but
plaintiffs’ efforts continue.  For example, recent school shootings
lead the victims and victim’s families to go after the makers and
distributors of violent video games and movies.63  A robbery/
shooting victim sued the producers, director, and distributors of
the movie Natural Born Killers  after the shooter attributed the
killing in large part to the movie.64  A mother and the estate of
her minor son sued a video game manufacturer for allegedly
causing her son’s friend to stab him.65  The families of murder
victims have sued musicians, their producers, and their distribu-
tors, alleging that the violent music caused the families’ loss.66
claim Entertainment, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002); Davidson v. Time
Warner, Inc., No. Civ. A V-94-006, 1997 WL 405907 (S.D. Tex. March 31, 1997);
McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988); Pahler v. Slayer, No. CV
79356, 2001 WL 1736476 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 2001); see also infra  notes 64-66
and accompanying text.
61 See infra  notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
62 See, e.g. , Carolina A. Fornos, Inspiring the Audience to Kill:  Should the En-
tertainment Industry be Held Liable for Intentional Acts of Violence Committed by
Viewers, Listeners, or Readers? , 46 LOY. L. REV. 441 (2000); Alan Stephens, First
Amendment Guaranty of Freedom of Speech or Press as Defense to Liability Stem-
ming from Speech Allegedly Causing Bodily Injury , 94 A.L.R.  FED. 26 (1989).
63 James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal for
failure to state a claim in a case arising out of shootings at a high school in Paducah,
Kentucky in 1997); Sanders v. Acclaim Entertainment, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D.
Colo. 2002) (granting dismissal for failure to state a claim in a case arising out of the
1999 shootings at Columbine High School in Colorado).
64 Byers v. Edmondson, 2001-1184 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/5/02), writ denied , 2002-1811
(La. 10/4/02), 826 So. 2d 551 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (Byers II). The trial court originally
dismissed the claim and on the first appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action. Id . at 554.  However, a sum-
mary judgment for the defendants was upheld on the second appeal. Id . at 557-58.
65 Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2002) (granting
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
66 Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., 1997 WL 405907 (S.D. Tex. March 31, 1997)
(granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in a lawsuit against the late rap
artist Tupac Shakur and Time Warner, Inc., that claimed Shakur’s music had caused
the murder of a state trooper); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App.
1988) (sustaining order of dismissal of demurrer in a suit alleging that defendant
Ozzy Osbourne’s music had caused a listener to commit suicide); Pahler v. Slayer,
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All of these cases were dismissed at an early stage of
proceedings.
These claims, and others, have been rejected for failure to es-
tablish the elements of negligence—primarily duty and causa-
tion.  In most jurisdictions, the elements of common law
negligence are duty, breach of duty, causation, and injury.67  Al-
legations of duty fail for lack of forseeability, a concept bound up
in policy considerations.68  Because foreseeability is analyzed
with the “reasonably prudent person” in mind, the actions of
mentally unstable persons or criminals always fall outside of
what the defendants could be expected to foresee.69  Causation
fails for similar reasons and because the criminal act of the
viewer or listener is seen as an intervening or superseding
cause.70
Because analysis of duty and causation involves a balancing of
the social costs of imposing liability, courts often mention the po-
tential chilling effect on artistic expression.71  Concern for a chil-
ling effect is bound up in First Amendment values of free
expression.  For example, in a lawsuit blaming rap music for the
murder of a state trooper, the court commented, “To create a
2001 WL 1736476 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 2001) (sustaining demurrer where parents
of a murder victim sued the metal band Slayer, its producers, and distributors for
wrongful death).
67 Weinberg v. Whatcom County, 241 F.3d 746, 751 (9th Cir. 2001); Jobe v. ATR
Marketing, Inc., 87 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1996); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
68 James , 300 F.3d at 691-92 (“The allocation of responsibility for determining this
question to the courts, rather than to juries, reveals that the duty inquiry contains an
important role for considering the policy consequences of imposing liability on a
certain class of situations.”); McCollum , 249 Cal. Rptr. at 196 (“Here, a very high
degree of forseeability would be required because of the great burden on society of
preventing the kind of ‘harm’ of which plaintiffs complain by restraining or punish-
ing artistic expression.”); Pahler , 2001 WL 1736476, at *6 (“Foreseeability has an
horizon.  It is set by balancing the policy reasons in favor of preventing the harm
complained of against the social and other costs attending the burden of imposing
liability.”).
69 See James , 300 F.3d at 693 (“We find that it is simply too far a leap from shoot-
ing characters on a video screen (an activity undertaken by millions) to shooting
people in a classroom (an activity undertaken by a handful, at most) for Carneal’s
actions to have been reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturers of the media that
Carneal played and viewed.”); McCollum , 249 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (“No rational per-
son would . . . mistake musical lyrics and poetry for literal commands or directives to
immediate action.”).
70 James , 300 F.3d at 699-700; Sanders , 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1276.
71 Sanders v. Acclaim Entertainment, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002);
McCollum , 249 Cal. Rptr. at 197; Davidson , 1997 WL 405907 at *12.
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duty requiring Defendants to police their recordings . . . would
result in the sale of only the most bland, least controversial mu-
sic.”72  In the suit blaming Ozzy Osbourne’s music for a suicide,
the California Court of Appeals stated,
[I]t is simply not acceptable to a free and democratic society to
impose a duty upon performing artists to limit and restrict
their creativity in order to avoid the dissemination of ideas in
artistic speech which may adversely affect emotionally troub-
led individuals.  Such a burden would quickly have the effect
of reducing and limiting artistic expression to only the
broadest standard of taste and acceptance and the lowest level
of offense, provocation and controversy.73
This concern for the potential chilling of free expression under-
lies First Amendment jurisprudence.74
Not only is the tort law analysis affected by First Amendment
concerns, but the decisions usually also find an independent con-
stitutional basis for dismissal under Brandenburg , which created
the First Amendment exception for speech that is intended to
incite imminent lawless action.75  Where the plaintiff’s theory is
that repeated exposure to the movie, music, or game has caused
the harm, the allegations fail the imminence requirement of
Brandenburg .76 Brandenburg  excepts speech that is intended to
cause violence right away, not speech that might, over time and
with repetition caused by the listener , lead to violence.77  Where
the work is alleged to have caused the listener or viewer to imi-
tate the violence depicted, it also fails the Brandenburg  test.78
72 Davidson , 1997 WL 405907 at *12.
73 McCollum , 249 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
74 The Court expressed concern for the chilling effect of civil damage awards in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).
75 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See supra  Part I.A.
76 According to the Sixth Circuit,
Even the theory of causation in this case is that persistent exposure to the
defendants’ media gradually undermined Carneal’s moral discomfort with
violence to the point that he solved his social disputes with a gun.  This
glacial process of personality development is far from the temporal immi-
nence that we have required to satisfy the Brandenburg  test.
James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002).
77 Recognizing this difference between speech in a particular setting and recorded
entertainment that can be consumed repeatedly and under conditions controlled by
the consumer, some plaintiffs have sought liability for entertainment products under
product liability theories. See, e.g ., id . at 701; Wilson v. Midway Games, 198 F.
Supp. 2d 167, 169 (D. Conn. 2002).
78 Under Brandenburg , speech is not protected under the First Amendment if it is
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or
produce such action.”  395 U.S. at 447.  This test was found to be a bar to suit in:
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Such a “copycat” allegation will probably never be incitement
because no matter how compelling the depiction, the work does
not directly exhort the viewer or listener to do anything, and cer-
tainly not immediately.79  Many cases cite the Supreme Court’s
statement in Hess , that speech may not be punished on the
ground it has a “tendency to lead to violence.”80  Some courts
have pointed out that violence, death, and the darker side of life
have always been a subject of both high and low art.81
Some plaintiffs have argued that the works causing violence
are obscene and therefore not protected speech, but courts have
responded that obscenity applies only to sexual imagery, not
violence.82
It is difficult to see how any mass-media product intended for
mass distribution can ever meet the Brandenburg  test.  First, the
speech is directed so broadly that it cannot be said to be intended
for specific persons.83  Second, because it is viewed or listened to
at different times in the future and under unpredictable condi-
Sanders v. Acclaim Entertainment, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279-80 (D. Colo.
2002); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 193 (Ct. App. 1988); Olivia N. v.
NBC, Inc., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892 (Ct. App. 1981); Wilson , 198 F. Supp. 2d at 182;
Byers v. Edmonson, 2001-1184 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/5/02), writ denied , 2002-1811 (La.
10/4/02), 826 So. 2d 551, 556-57 (La. App. 2002); Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., No.
Civ. A. V-94-006, 1997 WL 405907, at *20 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1997).
79 Byers , 826 So. 2d at 556-57, quoting  Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233,
266 (4th Cir. 1997); Pahler v. Slayer, No. CV 79356, 2001 WL 1736476, at *4.  See
also the discussion in Smolla, supra  note 28, at 934-38 (questioning the applicability
of Brandenburg  to civil actions against the entertainment industry).
80 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973), cited in James , 300 F.3d at 698 (citing
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), citing Hess); Zamara v.
CBS, 480 F. Supp. 199, 206 (D. Fla. 1979) (dismissing claim that violent television
programming gradually desensitized killer to violence and led to murder); Pahler ,
2001 WL 1736476, at *6; Byers , 826 So. 2d at 556; Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (Mass. 1989) (dismissing suit which blamed violent
movie for inspiring son’s killers); Davidson , 1997 WL 405907, at *21.
81 Sanders v. Acclaim Entertainment, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1274 (2002), cit-
ing  Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001);
McCollum v. CBS, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 190 n.4 (Ct. App. 1998) (giving examples from
Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Sylvia Plath, Arthur Miller and other authors).
82 James , 300 F.3d at 698; Pahler , 2001 WL 1736476, at *3; Byers , 826 So. 2d at
557; Davidson , 1997 WL 405907, at *17.  The plaintiff in Davidson  further argued
that Tupac Shakur’s lyrics fell within the fighting words exception to the First
Amendment, but this argument failed as well. Davidson , 1997 WL 405907, at *18.
83 Hess , 414 U.S. at 108-109 (“Since the uncontroverted evidence showed that
Hess’ statement was not directed to any person or group of persons, it cannot be
said that he was advocating, in the normal sense, any action.”). Hess  suggests that to
be incitement, speech must be directed to specific persons with the intention that
they act imminently.  Menninger, supra  note 16, § 22.
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tions, the speech itself is not likely to incite imminent lawless ac-
tion.  In Hess , for example, the court relied on the particular
circumstances of the speech, as well as its particular content, to
find that it was not incitement.84  Some have argued that it is
therefore inapplicable to media defendants in these kinds of
cases.85
In one case, however, a publisher was held liable for a speech
distributed widely through a book.86  The book was a “hit man”
instruction book that a murderer used in soliciting, planning for,
and committing the murder.  The court found this book was not
abstract advocacy, but advice to commit a specific criminal act.
The publisher was in fact aiding and abetting the crime, though
only with words.87  The direct how-to instructions of this book
are in contrast to the fictional representations of movies or video
games, or the ambiguous exhortations of songs.  The hit man
book case is the exception that proves the rule of non-liability for
producers of cultural works.
III
CONSUMERS OF VIOLENT MOVIES, MUSIC, OR BOOKS MAY
HAVE THEIR CONSUMPTION HABITS USED AGAINST THEM IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS
While the First Amendment protects producers of books, mov-
ies, and music from civil liability, it has not protected the con-
sumers of those products from having their taste used against
them in support of criminal convictions.88  In the majority of re-
84 Hess , 414 U.S. at 107.
85 See  Clay Calvert, Media Liability For Violent Conduct:  One Year Later , 23
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 247, 254 (2003) (discussing Prof. Rodney Smolla’s efforts to
get around the Brandenburg  obstacle for plaintiffs); Smolla, supra  note 28; Potential
Liability Arising from the Dissemination of Violent Music , 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 237 (2002) (panel discussion) (discussing alternatives to traditional negligence
or wrongful death actions); see also  Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017,
1024 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting a lesser standard than the Brandenburg  incitement
test for non-political speech alleged to have caused physical harm).
86 Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).  The Rice  court relied
on an earlier decision rejecting First Amendment protection for the publisher of
instructions on how to make illegal drugs.  United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835
(9th Cir. 1982).
87 Rice , 128 F.3d at 242.
88 The First Amendment does, however, protect consumers when they are
threatened with sanction for the exercise of their First Amendment right per se. See
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969).
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ported cases in which a criminal defendant’s viewing, listening, or
reading habits are introduced, the First Amendment is not even
raised.89  The prosecutor is permitted to introduce evidence de-
signed to show the defendant’s “state of mind,” “motive,” or
“plan,” and the defendant usually argues the evidence should be
kept out as irrelevant or unduly prejudicial under the evidence
rules.90  Such challenges then usually fail on appeal, because of
the wide discretion given to trial courts on evidentiary matters.91
The threshold for a showing of relevance is very low: relevant
evidence is that having “any tendency” to make the existence of
a material fact more likely or less likely.92  Relevant evidence
may be excluded if its “probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues or misleading the jury,”93 but the balancing of unfair
prejudice and probative value is generally discretionary with the
trial court and not a question of law.
The film Natural Born Killers  provides several good examples.
The producers of this movie successfully defended against a civil
suit by crime victims’ families.94  Yet a fascination with, or just a
taste for, the movie has been used against criminal defendants in
a number of cases.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in State v. Begay , affirmed a
first-degree murder conviction where the state told the jury in its
opening statement that “evidence would show that Defendant
liked the film, Natural Born Killers , had seen it numerous times,
and had announced his desire to ‘pull a fatality.’”95  The state
argued that this evidence supported a finding of premeditation
89 “Reported” cases here include unpublished cases that have been made availa-
ble on Westlaw or Lexis.  A review of such cases is necessarily one-sided.  It will not
include cases where the defendant was successful in keeping out such evidence at
trial—if such cases exist—unless the defendant was convicted, appealed, and the
state then cross-appealed on the evidentiary issue.  For the most part, the databases
of reported cases will yield cases where the convicted defendant appealed an unfa-
vorable ruling on the issue.
90 See FED. R. EVID. 401, 403.
91 Courts frequently say that whether to admit evidence is within the discretion of
the trial court, but in fact many evidentiary decisions involve questions of law, ques-
tions of fact, and elements of discretion—each of which should be and often are
reviewed under a different standard. See  Nicolas, supra  note 9, at 532-34.
92 FED. R. EVID. 401.
93 FED. R. EVID. 403.
94 See  Menninger, supra  note 16, at 17.
95 State v. Begay, 964 P.2d 102, 106 (N.M. 1998).
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and that the killing was done simply for fun.96  These arguments
were repeated in closing argument.  On appeal, the defendant
did not raise the First Amendment, but argued that the prosecu-
tor’s and the judge’s remarks about the film97 “improperly intro-
duced inflammatory and prejudicial evidence, and deprived him
of a fair trial.”98  These objections were not raised at trial, and it
appears appellate counsel was arguing that the error was so fun-
damental that reversal was nevertheless required, but the review-
ing court was unmoved.99  For unpreserved claims of error, the
court placed a heavy burden on the defendant to show plain or
fundamental error, which the court found was not met.
Similarly, other prosecutors have used the defendant’s associa-
tion with the movie to suggest that the movie was the inspiration
for the charged crimes.  In State v. Taylor , a Louisiana murder
case, the state used the defendant’s remarks about “his favorite
movie,” Natural Born Killers , to show state of mind, motive, and
intent.100  A friend of the defendant testified that the defendant
had “critiqued the bank robbery featured in the film and dis-
cussed how” he would have done it.101  The state supreme court
found that the statements were relevant and suggested that, be-
cause they were contested at trial, any prejudice was mini-
mized.102  The same movie was also linked to the defendant’s
state of mind in a Massachusetts murder case, Commonwealth v.
O’Brien.103  The court admitted evidence of a newspaper article
found in the defendant’s bedroom.104  The article described an-
other murder that had been inspired by the movie, and quoted
the killers’ description of their fascination with the movie.105  The
Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s reasoning,
and added, “The article also could have explained what other-
wise might appear to be a random act of violence.  Whether to
admit such an article is a matter committed to the sound discre-
96 Id . at 107.
97 In ruling on an objection, the trial judge stated that the movie “glorifies vio-
lence and depicts criminal drug use.” Id .
98 Id .
99 Id . at 106-108.  The court also rejected arguments that the prosecutor “testi-
fied” when he described the contents of the movie during argument. Id . at 107-09.
100 838 So. 2d 729, 746 (La. 2003).
101 Id .
102 See id .
103 736 N.E.2d 841, 852 (Mass. 2000).
104 Id .
105 Id .
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tion of the trial judge.  Absent a showing of palpable error, we do
not disturb that ruling.”106
In State v. Loukaitis , a Washington murder prosecution where
the defendant pleaded insanity, the court upheld admission of ev-
idence that Natural Born Killers was one of his favorite movies,
and that he told witnesses he would like to go on a killing spree
like the one in the movie.107  The defendant had failed to object
at trial, and also used the evidence in his own insanity defense.108
The defendant’s fascination with the movie was found admissi-
ble in the penalty phase of State v. White , a North Carolina capi-
tal murder case.109  The state supreme court found that objection
to the evidence had been waived and suggested that the evidence
was relevant to aggravating and mitigating circumstances in any
event.110
In Beasley v. State , a Georgia murder and robbery case, the
court not only admitted evidence that the defendant had watched
the movie twenty times, but showed the movie in its entirety to
the jury.111  Witnesses testified that the defendant wanted to be
like the characters in the movie and sometimes used their names.
The Georgia Supreme Court held that the evidence was relevant
to show that the defendant was “encouraged by the movie to
commit a violent murder,” and “to show [the defendant’s] bent
of mind.”112 A dissenting judge agreed that evidence of the de-
fendant’s fascination with the movie was relevant, but argued
that the court went too far in showing the gruesome movie to the
jury.113  The dissent would have held that the prejudicial value of
the film outweighed its relevance, and criticized the majority’s
rationale that the film was relevant to the defendant’s “bent of
mind”:
Based on this broad reasoning, any book, movie, record, or
television program that includes a crime similar to the one
with which an accused is charged would be relevant to show
that individual’s bent toward criminal activity.  Under this ex-
106 Id . (internal citations omitted).
107 State v. Loukaitis, No. 17007-1-III, 1999 WL 1044203, at *9-10 (Wash. Ct. App.
Nov. 16, 1999).  The court also admitted evidence that the defendant liked Stephen
King books and that he wrote “dark” and “scary” poetry. Id .
108 Id . at *10.
109 565 S.E.2d 55, 62 (N.C. 2002).
110 Id .
111 502 S.E.2d 235, 238 (Ga. 1998).
112 Id .
113 Id . at 241 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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pansive test, reading the works of Nobel Prize winning authors
like Toni Morrison and William Faulkner can become evi-
dence that an accused had a “bent of mind” to commit mur-
der.  Because this rationale is simplistic and overreaching, I
find it unpersuasive as a basis for allowing the jury to view the
movie.114
It is interesting that in all these cases, the basis for admission
of evidence of the movie, or the defendant’s fascination with it,
seems to be an assumption of a causal link between the movie
and crime—a link that has been rejected in the suits by crime
victims against producers of the movie.  When the courts speak
of bent or state of mind, or motive, they are suggesting that the
defendant’s state of mind is caused by the film, or that the defen-
dant is motivated by or “encouraged” by the film to commit a
crime.  There is the strong suggestion in the decisions that simi-
larities between the crime charged and the crimes depicted in the
movie show where the defendant got the idea for his actions.115
Using similar reasoning, courts have allowed musical taste to
be used against criminal defendants.116  In State v. Hayward , an
Oregon murder prosecution, the state introduced evidence that
the defendants worshipped Satan and listened to “death metal”
music.117  One witness testified that the crimes were to honor the
death metal bands Deicide and Cannibal Corpse.118  One defen-
dant was said to have emitted a “death metal growl” just before
he attacked and that the growl sounded like one on a Cannibal
Corpse compact disc.119  The state supreme court upheld the ad-
mission of the “death metal” evidence to show motive—that the
crimes were “more than simply a robbery gone awry.”120  In
Skinner v. State , a Missouri case, the defendant used the names
of two death metal bands, Mercyful Fate and Evil Slayer, in sign-
114 Id . at 244 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
115 See id . at 238 (holding the jury could infer that the movie encouraged the
crime); Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 736 N.E.2d 841, 842 (Mass. 2000) (noting simi-
larities between murder in newspaper article and the crime charged, and similarities
in the pleasure taken in killing by the defendant and the killers in the article, who
also enjoyed  the movie).
116 State v. Hayward, 963 P.2d 667, 674 (Or. 1998) (upholding admission of evi-
dence of defendant’s interest in death metal music and Satanism); Skinner v. State,
784 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding admission of evidence of use of
heavy metal band names, Evil Slayer and Mercyful Fate, in defendant’s letters).
117 Hayward , 963 P.2d at 674.
118 Id .
119 Id .
120 Id . at 675.
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ing letters.121  The appellate court rejected an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel argument based on the defense attorney’s
failure to adequately challenge the prosecution’s use of these
names.
Rap music, especially “gangster” or “gangsta” rap, also makes
an appearance.122  In Bailey v. State , a Mississippi case, the de-
fendant appealed a murder conviction, arguing, among other
things, that it was error to admit a cassette tape found in his
car.123  The tape, made by a group called the Mississippi Mafia,
was titled Another Mississippi Murder .  Its cover showed three
males holding automatic weapons.124  The defendant argued it
was also error to permit the prosecutor to use the tape to argue
in closing: “Ladies and gentlemen, in going through the evidence
of the case and looking at something that was in this defendant’s
possession, it speaks true as to this defendant’s attitude.  This
isn’t nothing but another Mississippi murder.”125  The appellate
court found that objections to the tape and the prosecutor’s re-
marks were waived and/or harmless.126  Any error in the admis-
sion of rap lyrics was also found harmless in People v.
Richardson , an unpublished California case.127  The defendant
there was a rap artist, and the state cross-examined a defense
witness about the music the defendant listened to, thereby bring-
ing in lyrics that referred to violent and criminal acts.128
In another unpublished California case, People v. Scott , the
court found admission of rap lyrics to be harmless error, but
made clear that error had occurred.129  The lyrics had been found
in the defendant’s room one year before the murder with which
he was charged, and the state could not prove that the lyrics were
the defendant’s and not written by another rap artist who had
been sleeping in his room at the time.
121 Skinner , 784 S.W.2d at 875-76.
122 In an Indiana case, a murder defendant tried to use violent rap music lyrics in
his own defense, to blame his actions in part on the music.  Rascoe v. State, 736
N.E.2d 246, 247-48 (2000).
123 Bailey v. State, 785 So. 2d 1071 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
124 Id . at 1075.
125 Id . at 1075.
126 Id . at 1076.
127 People v. Richardson, No. F032406, 2001 WL 1297500 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 24,
2001).
128 Id . at *14-15.
129 People v. Scott, No. A088396, 2001 WL 1663224, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 31,
2001).
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The present case involves a set of song lyrics, which—
whatever one may feel about their quality as literature—are
the result of the creative process.  We start down a wavering
path when we begin to judge people’s actions by the content of
the literature they keep about them.  Had Shakespeare been
charged with regicide, we doubt Macbeth  would be admissible
evidence.  In any case appellant did not write the lyrics and
there was no evidence that he had even read them.130
The court nowhere mentioned the First Amendment, however,
and found the error to be harmless given the remaining
evidence.131
Thus, objections to evidence of movie, musical, or other cul-
tural taste in state criminal trials have been based on unfair
prejudice or lack of relevance.  The reviewing courts have given
the trial courts broad leeway to allow such evidence to be used
against the defendants.132  Most of the state court decisions do
not state the standard of review, but, in practice, their review is
deferential.133
While the state cases discussed above generally do not mention
the defendant’s constitutional right to consume entertainment, in
Dressler v. McCaughtry ,134 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected a rare First Amendment challenge to the introduction of
defendant’s violent and pornographic materials in a murder pros-
ecution, a challenge it deemed “borderline frivolous at best.”135
The evidence included videotapes and pictures of intentionally
violent and homosexual sexual acts, including photographs and
videotapes of actual mutilation and murder.136  Descriptions of
the evidence in the court of appeals opinion as well as in the state
130 Id . at *11.
131 The court found the error harmless even though the jury had deliberated for
five days.  The reviewing court found it was “not . . . a close case.” Id .
132 This may be true even where the evidence is of the defendant’s own expres-
sion, and not consumption of others’ expression.  Thus, where the state introduced
photographs of a defendant’s tattoos, the court acknowledged First Amendment
considerations, but found that the limits of the constitutional protection were de-
fined by relevance.  State v. Kendrick, 736 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
Because relevance was in turn committed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
the limits of constitutional protection became discretionary as well. See id.  at 1083-
84.
133 One case mentions the abuse of discretion standard of review in passing.
Scott , 2001 WL 1663224, at *9.
134 Dressler v. McCaughtry, 238 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2001).
135 Id . at 912.
136 Id . at 910.
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court appeal137 make it difficult to tell exactly what the materials
were, but they appear to have included pornography as well as
purely violent images.  Much of this evidence was admitted to
support the state’s theory of “homosexual overkill.”138  The
crime charged was an exceptionally gruesome murder followed
by mutilation, and the federal appeals court stated: “The fact that
[the defendant] maintained a collection of videos and pictures
depicting intentional violence is probative of the State’s claim
that he had an obsession with that subject.  A person obsessed
with violence is more likely to commit murder, and therefore the
videos and photographs are relevant.”139  Thus, the court seemed
to accept that the ideas or acts depicted in materials a defendant
reads or views could be imputed to the defendant.  The court also
found that the mere use of this evidence did not affect the defen-
dant’s First Amendment rights because he was not punished for
their possession, and the potential chilling effect of the eviden-
tiary rulings was “overstate[d].”140  The court rejected the First
Amendment argument and upheld the trial court’s finding of
relevance.141
Subsequent cases have cautioned that the Dressler  court’s rea-
soning should not be taken too far.  In United States v. Rogers ,142
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the admission of
portions of a how-to manual for explosives and firearms, The An-
archist’s Cookbook , found in the defendant’s possession.  Never-
theless, the court noted the judge’s
obligation to keep the prosecutor from suggesting that [the de-
fendant] should be convicted because he owned seditious liter-
ature, that anyone who would read a book called The
Anarchist’s Cookbook  must hold his legal obligations in con-
tempt, or that possession of the book implied that [the defen-
dant] wanted to become a sniper.143
Although the court cited Dressler , the First Amendment did
not figure in the decision.144
137 State v. Dressler, 514 N.W.2d 53 (unpublished table decision) No. 92-2049-CR,
1993 WL 469759 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov 17, 1993).
138 Id . at *2.
139 Dressler , 238 F.3d at 914.
140 Id . at 915.
141 Id . at 914-15.
142 United States v. Rogers, 270 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 2001).
143 Id . at 1081.
144 See id .  The admission of instructional or how-to information in the defen-
dant’s possession has been addressed often.  Where the defendant’s knowledge or
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A. Pornography
Pornography may or may not contain elements of violence;
therefore, pornography as a separate category is outside the
scope of this Article, which is concerned with violent entertain-
ment or art.  Nevertheless, cases addressing evidence of the crim-
inal defendant’s possession of pornography as support for
conviction on another crime raise issues similar to those raised by
the admission of evidence of consumption of violent entertain-
ment.  Does the introduction of such evidence chill First Amend-
ment rights?  Is such evidence probative of a material fact at
issue?  A look at the reasoning in some of these cases is
instructive.
Pornography, unlike other art or entertainment products,
seems to enjoy a special status because it has been addressed by
the Supreme Court.  In Stanley v. Georgia , the Supreme Court
held that the First Amendment protected private possession of
pornography in the home.145  In a later case, the Court stated,
“[A] person’s inclinations and ‘fantasies . . . are his own and be-
yond the reach of government.’”146  In light of this precedent, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for know-
ing receipt of child pornography where the government had in-
troduced evidence that the defendant also possessed adult
videotapes that did not involve minors.147  The court stated,
“[O]ne must be mindful . . . that, even as to erotic material, a
person’s possession of some of this material for non-commercial
use may well be entitled to protection under the [F]irst
[A]mendment.”148  However, the technical basis for the court’s
ruling was lack of relevance and overwhelming prejudicial effect
under the rules of evidence.149  In another receipt of child por-
nography case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
the trial court had erred in admitting evidence that the defendant
had possessed another child pornography tape when that posses-
intent is material, such evidence may be admitted. See  United States v. Walters, 351
F.3d 159, 165-69 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that possession of THE ANARCHIST’S
COOKBOOK was relevant to show defendant’s knowledge when charged with bomb-
making, and discussing similar cases).
145 See infra  note 177.
146 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 551-52 (1992) (quoting Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973)).
147 United States v. Harvey, 991 F.2d 981, 997 (2d Cir. 1993).
148 Id . at 995.
149 Id . at 996.
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sion was legal at the time.150  But the appellate court found the
error to be harmless in light of the remaining evidence.
One interesting case is People of the Territory of Guam v.
Shymanovitz , where the court reversed convictions for multiple
counts of sexual abuse of children because of the introduction of
evidence that the defendant possessed adult gay pornography.151
The court did not mention the First Amendment rights of the
defendant, but instead found that the evidence lacked any proba-
tive value, and was substantially prejudicial.152  The court re-
versed for errors under the evidence rules for relevance, unfair
prejudice, and prior acts.153  “The mere possession of reading
material that describes a particular type of activity makes it
neither more nor less likely that a defendant would intentionally
engage in the conduct described and thus fails to meet the test of
relevancy under Rule 401.”154  Although it did not rely on the
Constitution, the court’s comments reflect concerns that also un-
derlie the First Amendment:
Criminal activity is a wildly popular subject of fiction and non-
fiction writing—ranging from the National Enquirer to Les
Miserables  to In Cold Blood . Any defendant with a modest
library of just a few books and magazines would undoubtedly
possess reading material containing descriptions of numerous
acts of criminal conduct.  Under the government’s theory, the
case against an accused child molester would be stronger if he
owned a copy of Nabokov’s Lolita , and any murder defendant
would be unfortunate to have in his possession a collection of
Agatha Christie mysteries or even James Bond stories.  Woe,
particularly, to the son accused of patricide or incest who has a
copy of Oedipus Rex  at his bedside.  In this case the govern-
ment offered into evidence the text of two out of the dozens of
articles from the four “Stroke” magazines and none of the ar-
ticles from the “Playboy” or “After Midnight” magazines.
Undoubtedly there was other reading material in Shyma-
novitz’ residence that was discovered but neither seized nor
introduced into evidence.  To allow prosecutors to parade
before the jury snippets from a defendant’s library—the text
of two magazine articles and descriptions of four magazines—
would compel all  persons to choose the contents of their li-
braries with considerable care; for it is the innocent, and not
just the guilty, who are sometimes the subject of good-faith
150 United States v. LaChapelle, 969 F.2d 632, 638 (8th Cir. 1992).
151 157 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 1998).
152 Id . at 1159-60.
153 FED. R. EVID. 401, 403, 404(b).
154 People of the Territory of Guam v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir.
1998).  The court applied the abuse of discretion standard of review. Id . at 1160.
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prosecutions.155
The Shymanovitz  decision can partly be explained by the pros-
ecution’s egregious attempt to prejudice the defendant in the
jury’s eyes for his homosexuality, a sexual preference that has
nothing to do with child abuse.156  Nevertheless, it is a rare exam-
ple of the court reversing the introduction of consumption evi-
dence for lack of relevance to the elements of the crime.  The
court’s reasoning is certainly applicable to other situations where
the state attempts to use a criminal defendant’s taste in entertain-
ment against him or her.157
IV
ANALOGOUS ASSOCIATIONAL EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS
While the First Amendment does not figure in the Natural
Born Killers  cases or most of the other cases noted in the previ-
ous section, it has been strenuously asserted in other related
criminal evidentiary arguments.  An analogous constitutional and
evidentiary problem is raised when evidence of a criminal defen-
dant’s associations or beliefs is introduced against him or her.
Court decisions in this area are helpful in analyzing the problem
of evidence of First Amendment consumption.  These freedom of
association cases suggest that irrelevant evidence of First
Amendment activity in a criminal case can violate the defen-
dant’s constitutional rights.  However, many of these cases also
reduce the constitutional issue to one of relevance, with no
heightened standard or scrutiny for First Amendment evidence.
The Supreme Court has held that evidence of prison gang
membership may be relevant and admissible in criminal cases,
but that where there is not a clear showing of relevance, admis-
sion of such evidence violates the First Amendment.158  In United
States v. Abel ,159 the Court upheld the admission of evidence that
the defendant and a defense witness belonged to a prison gang
155 Id . at 1159.
156 See also  State v. Lee, 525 N.W.2d 179, 184 (Neb. 1994) (holding evidence of
defendant’s possession of homosexual pornography irrelevant to charge of child
rape); State v. Tizard, 897 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (holding evi-
dence of defendant’s possessing homosexual pornography irrelevant to charges of
sexual battery).
157 United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 56 (1984).
158 Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 165 (1992).
159 469 U.S. at 56.
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that required its members to lie, cheat, and kill to protect each
other, holding that such evidence was probative of the witness’
bias.  Because the evidence was offered only to impeach the wit-
ness, the Court noted that its introduction would not sanction the
witness or the defendant for an association.160  “Whatever First
Amendment associational rights an inmate may have to join a
prison group, those rights were not implicated.”161  Because no
punishment of the exercise of a constitutional right was involved,
the Court suggested that the required showing of relevance need
not be so rigorous: “For purposes of the law of evidence the jury
may be permitted to draw an inference of subscription to the ten-
ets of the organization from membership alone, even though
such an inference would not be sufficient to convict beyond a
reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution under the Smith
Act.”162  The Court seemed to consider only the First Amend-
ment rights of the witness, not whether the impeachment evi-
dence might also in effect tarnish the defendant in the jury’s eyes
for belonging to the same gang.  Thus, the Abel  Court seems to
suggest that evidence of associational activity does not violate the
First Amendment.
Some years later, however, the Court ruled that admission of
evidence of gang membership at sentencing could violate the
First Amendment.  In Dawson v. Delaware ,163 the Supreme
Court found a death penalty defendant’s First Amendment rights
had been violated when the government introduced, at the pen-
alty phase, evidence that he belonged to the Aryan Brotherhood.
The Court noted, however, that “the Constitution does not erect
a per se  barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one’s
beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because those be-
liefs and associations are protected by the First Amendment.”164
The Court rejected the defendant’s “broad submission” to the
contrary.165  The error in Dawson , however, was that the prose-
cution had agreed to a stipulation that briefly described the racist
beliefs of the Aryan Brotherhood, but never showed the rele-
160 Id . at 53.
161 Id . at 53 n.2 (internal citation omitted).
162 Id . at 52-53 (distinguishing earlier cases that “dealt with the constitutional re-
quirements for convicting persons under the Smith Act and state syndicalism laws
for belonging to organizations which espoused illegal aims and engaged in  illegal
conduct”).
163 503 U.S. at 159.
164 Id . at 165.
165 Id .
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vance of that stipulation to the crime.  The stipulation thus in-
vited the jury to draw an inference, “[b]ut the inference which
the jury was invited to draw in this case tended to prove nothing
more than the abstract beliefs of the Delaware chapter.”166  Be-
cause abstract beliefs are constitutionally protected, the Court
held that Dawson’s First Amendment rights were violated.
The Dawson  Court reconciled its holding with the earlier Abel
opinion, and seemed to hinge the constitutional question on rele-
vance.  The Court stated, for example, that had the state pro-
duced evidence that the gang “is associated with drugs and
violent escape attempts at prisons, and that [it advocated] the
murder of fellow inmates . . . we would have a much different
case.”167  The Court added that if the state had “presented evi-
dence showing more than mere abstract beliefs on Dawson’s
part,” it might have avoided such a problem.168
The Court was quite clear, however, that the First Amendment
prohibited the evidence that was introduced.  The Court stated
that the First Amendment not only prohibits defining the exer-
cise of a constitutional right as a crime, but it also prevents the
state from using a person’s associations in other ways against that
person,169 including as evidence at sentencing.  This is an impor-
tant point for the argument over use of speech “consumption” as
evidence in a criminal trial.  Under the Dawson  Court’s reason-
ing, a defendant’s First Amendment rights might be violated if
irrelevant consumption evidence is admitted in a criminal trial.
Lower courts have used Dawson  primarily to uphold the ad-
mission of gang membership or other First Amendment evi-
dence, such as the defendant’s own expression, finding that the
government met the required showing of relevance.170  In the few
166 Id . at 166.
167 Id . at 165.
168 Id . at 167.
169 As other examples of prohibited uses of such evidence, the Court cited denial
of bar membership based on communist party membership and the required collec-
tion of membership lists from associations. Id . at 168 (citing Schware v. Bd. of Bar
Examiners of N.M., 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960)).
170 See, e.g. , Kapadia v. Tally, 229 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the trial
court properly considered at sentencing defendant’s post-conviction anti-Semitic re-
marks where the remarks were relevant to show motive and future dangerousness);
United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1530 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the trial
court properly admitted evidence of religious beliefs, religious practices, and racist
beliefs as relevant to the crime); United States v. Easter, 66 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that evidence of defendant’s gang membership was admissible as rel-
evant to identity); People v. Smith, 68 P.3d 302 (Cal. 2003) (holding that it was not
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cases where the courts find error, it is usually harmless.171  Be-
cause the issue turns on relevance, courts review the issue under
the discretionary evidentiary standard of review, rather than a
more rigorous constitutional standard.172  One court stated,
“[B]ecause we already have determined that the evidence in
question was relevant, we need not determine whether the defen-
dant’s statement constituted protected speech.  Even if it did, the
statement was still admissible because it was relevant.”173  Thus,
the constitutional nature of the defendants’ arguments does not
affect the evidentiary analysis or the degree of scrutiny by the
appellate courts.  The constitutional challenge is reduced to one
of simple relevance.
A few defendants have cited Dawson  in challenging the admis-
sion of First Amendment “consumption evidence,” although it is
not characterized as such.  In a California case, People v. Rog-
ers ,174 the defendant in a drug possession case argued that his
attorney was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to
evidence that he had a book titled Recreational Drugs  on his
nightstand.  The court found the book relevant to the issue of
possession and that any objection would have been “unavail-
error to admit evidence of defendant’s racist remarks made during commission of
crime); People v. Ramos, 938 P.2d 950 (Cal. 1997) (holding that defendant’s diary
entries were relevant to show his racial antipathy toward persons, groups, and insti-
tutions); People v. Shatner, 673 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ill. 1996) (holding that even if there
was error in admitting gang membership evidence, it was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt, and that evidence of defendant’s religious beliefs was relevant because
tied to the charged murder); State v. Fanus, 79 P.3d 847, 864 (Or. 2003) (holding that
evidence of defendant’s prior racist expressions was relevant at sentencing to future
dangerousness).
171 See, e.g. , Wainwright v. Lockhart, 80 F.3d 1226, 1232 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
on appeal from grant of habeas corpus that while it was error to admit evidence of
gang membership, the error did not make the death sentencing proceeding funda-
mentally unfair); see also  Ochoa v. State, 963 P.2d 583, 597 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998)
(“While we find the use of gang evidence in the first stage of trial to be error, Ochoa
has failed to show that the error was sufficiently prejudicial.  Accordingly, relief is
denied.”).
172 E.g. , Beasley , 72 F.3d at 1524 (applying abuse of discretion standard); see also
United States v. Easter, 66 F.3d at 1020 (same); State v. Rizzo, 833 A.2d 363, 445,
(Conn. 2003) (same).  Many decisions are not explicit about the standard of review,
but the standard appears deferential.  One exception is People v. Shatner , 673
N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ill. 1996), which applied a constitutional standard of harmless er-
ror: “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
173 Rizzo , 833 A.2d at 446.
174 People v. Rogers, No. A094545, 2002 WL 31082206 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 18,
2002).
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ing.”175  In a Connecticut case, State v. Rizzo ,176 the defendant
was sentenced to death and challenged the admission at sentenc-
ing of a portion of his statement.  That portion stated that he was
“really interested in serial killings” and that he had read and
watched videos about them.177  It went on to say that his favorite
book was about Jeffrey Dahmer, the well-known serial killer, and
that he also possessed videos and other books about Dahmer.178
The appellate court upheld the admission of this portion of his
statement, finding that it was relevant to establish “the requisite
intent to satisfy the aggravating factor, that is, it supported the
reasonable inference that, when he killed the victim, he intended
to accomplish more than the victim’s death; he intended to cause
the victim psychological or physical pain, suffering or torture.”179
Having found the evidence relevant, the court found no need to
discuss whether the speech was protected.180  The court did not
discuss whether the statement also implicated the defendant’s
rights as a consumer of speech.
Thus, even under Dawson , lower courts treat the claim of con-
stitutional error like any evidentiary argument, turning it into
one of relevance and trial court discretion.  The constitutional
nature of the objection adds little to the analysis in the end.
Even in the rare case where the reviewing court finds error, a
harmless-error showing is easily made by the state.  Yet this ap-
proach is not necessarily correct even under Dawson .  Justice
Blackmun commented in his Dawson  concurrence that the court
of appeals on remand should consider whether a harmless-error
analysis was even appropriate: “Because of the potential chilling
effect that consideration of First Amendment activity at sentenc-
ing might have, there is a substantial argument that harmless-er-
ror analysis is not appropriate for the type of error before us
today.”181
175 Id . at *11.
176 833 A.2d at 363.
177 Id . at 382 n.13.
178 Id . at 445 n.74.
179 Id . at 446.
180 Id .
181 Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 169 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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V
IS THE DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT
CONSUMERS AND PRODUCERS JUSTIFIED?
The foregoing parts show that producers of art and entertain-
ment escape civil liability and regulation while consumers of
their products may have their consumption used against them in
a criminal trial.  Is this difference in First Amendment protection
really a difference, and, if so, is it justified?
One might argue that the comparison is not apt—that civil
suits against producers do not parallel the use of consumption
evidence in criminal trials.  In the former type of case, the pro-
tected First Amendment activity is  the tort or the prohibited ac-
tivity, while in the latter cases the protected activity is merely
evidence  in a criminal trial.182
To be sure, these are very different situations.  Where the First
Amendment activity is defined as a tort or crime, the constitu-
tional violation is obvious.  Where evidence of constitutional ac-
tivity is used against a criminal defendant, there may be a
violation only if the evidence is irrelevant, which depends on its
materiality and probative value.  The burdens with respect to the
constitutional issues thus also differ: a civil plaintiff attempting to
overcome First Amendment objections to the lawsuit must show
that the allegations meet the stringent requirements of the Bran-
denburg  incitement test, while the state’s burden as the propo-
nent of evidence in a criminal trial is merely to show that the
evidence has “any tendency” to make the existence of a material
fact more or less likely to be true.183
Yet, the comparison is still valid between civil suits against pro-
ducers and evidentiary rulings in criminal cases against consum-
ers.  While the comparisons between civil suits and criminal trials
here are not formally apposite, there is still a striking inconsis-
tency in the judicial reasoning underlying the opinions. In civil
suits against producers, or when legislators attempt to limit pro-
ducers, courts will not find a causal connection between the
speech and crime.  Yet, courts are quick to find that such a con-
nection justifies the admission of consumption habits in criminal
182 Where consumption itself is threatened with punishment, and not just used as
evidence, the court is more likely to recognize the First Amendment rights of the
consumer. See, e.g. , Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); see also  Balagun v. N.J.
Dep’t of Corrs., 824 A.2d 1109, 1112 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2003).
183 FED. R. EVID. 401.
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cases.  Also, while one can argue that using consumption habits
as evidence  in a criminal trial is not the same as punishing or
sanctioning such consumption,184 in fact it can be.  If the jury is
invited to infer guilt, or an aggravating circumstance for sentenc-
ing, from the mere exercise of a constitutional right, then the ex-
ercise of that right is being punished.  Such was the rationale of
the Supreme Court in Dawson .185 There may be times when the
violation seems less significant, as when there is substantial addi-
tional evidence of guilt or when the prejudicial value of the dis-
puted evidence is minimal.  There may also be times when the
violation is great, when the admission of consumption evidence
may be responsible for a conviction.
One might also argue that the criminal cases are not inconsis-
tent with the civil cases because, in fact, the criminal cases do not
assume a causal connection between protected speech and crime.
When the criminal courts, the argument goes, allow evidence of
movie or music consumption to show motive, intent, or state of
mind, they are not assuming causation, but that the defendant’s
entertainment selections reflect  his mental state.  Thus, the evi-
dence is not admitted to show that the entertainment products
caused the crime, but only to show what was on the defendant’s
mind.  The appellate cases reviewed do not support such an argu-
ment.  At best they are silent on the distinction between causa-
tion and reflection, and much of the language supports an
inference of causation.186  Yet, even if this argument is correct, a
184 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals made a similar distinction when it re-
jected a First Amendment challenge to evidence of the defendant’s collection of
videotapes and photographs:
The fundamental flaw in [the defendant’s] First Amendment argument, and
the major distinguishing factor in the string of broad First Amendment
cases he relies upon, is that he was not convicted of possessing, distributing,
or looking at the videos and pictures in question.  Although they may have
helped convict [the defendant] of murder, he never explains how his right
to possess or look at them was affected by their use as evidence against
him.  And [the defendant] dramatically overstates the potential chilling ef-
fect of the evidentiary use of these materials, as they formed only one link
in the long chain of evidence that proved his guilt.  Innocent citizens, who
presumably would not face a mountain of other circumstantial evidence of
their guilt, need not fear a murder prosecution based on the mere posses-
sion of lawful videotapes and photographs.
Dressler v. McCaughtry, 238 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal citations
omitted).
185 503 U.S. at 168.
186 When the evidence is admitted to show “motive,” this could mean that the
movie or music “motivated” the defendant, or merely that it reflects a pre-existing
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gaping relevance problem remains: millions watch, read, or listen
to the same products without committing crimes.  Absent a clear
statement by the defendant, or other corroboration, how can any
reliable connection be shown between state of mind and choice
of entertainment in a particular case?
Aside from these relevancy issues, there are questions about
how policy considerations apply in the two kinds of cases.  One
example is consideration of potential chilling effects on free
speech rights.  One might argue that less protection need be af-
forded consumption rights in a criminal trial because the poten-
tial chilling effect on the exercise of constitutional rights is less
there than when producers are faced with civil liability or regula-
tory restriction.  The chilling effect of civil damage awards or reg-
ulation is well-recognized.187 How does the admission of
evidence of consumption habits in a criminal trial chill rights?
One might argue that civil liability is a direct and real threat to
those making movies or music, but most fans probably do not
consider committing crimes, and, therefore, might not be intimi-
dated by the possibility that their consumption could be used
against them if they should be accused of violating the law.  Yet,
what of those consumers who do not plan to commit crimes, but
are afraid of being accused unjustly?  These consumers might
worry that their choices of entertainment or art will make them
suspect.  In Dawson , Justice Blackmun’s concurrence recognized
the argument that even the use of evidence of prison gang mem-
bership at sentencing could chill constitutional rights of
association.188
A related chilling-effect argument was rejected by a unani-
mous Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell .189  In Mitchell , the
Court upheld the constitutionality of sentence enhancements
based on racial motivation and found arguments about the chil-
ling effect of such a statutory scheme “attenuated” and “specula-
tive,”190 explaining that:
We must conjure up a vision of a Wisconsin citizen suppressing
his unpopular bigoted opinions for fear that if he later com-
motive.  The same distinction may exist where the evidence is admitted to show
intent, premeditation, or state of mind.  Court decisions do not clearly address this
distinction.
187 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).
188 503 U.S. at 169 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
189 508 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1993).
190 Id .
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mits an offense covered by the statute, these opinions will be
offered at trial to establish that he selected his victim on ac-
count of the victim’s protected status, thus qualifying him for
penalty enhancement . . . . This is simply too speculative a
hypothesis.191
The distinction, however, is that in Mitchell  the defendant was
not to be punished for his beliefs alone, or for abstract beliefs,
but for acting unlawfully on them.192  The beliefs were not used
to imply guilt, but to enhance punishment where those beliefs
had led to crime.  Where evidence of consumption habits is intro-
duced to imply guilt, the potential for chilling is less speculative.
One must conjure up a vision of citizens worried that their
choices of music or entertainment will be used to make them sus-
pects in unsolved crimes, or as worthy of state monitoring.  Espe-
cially as monitoring of consumer habits increases, citizens might
worry about the records they leave on websites, with credit card
companies, and elsewhere, setting forth their tastes in music,
movies, and books.  That such fears might be engendered even
by criminal evidence rulings is not so far-fetched.193 Such rulings
tell the public that certain music or entertainment can get you in
trouble.  Such rulings might also embolden law enforcement to
target as suspect those who consume certain entertainment
products.
VI
RIGHTING THE BALANCE: HOW TO PROTECT CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS AS CONSUMERS OF FIRST
AMENDMENT SPEECH
If in fact there is an untenable difference in the protection of
producers and consumers of expression under the First Amend-
191 Id .
192 Id . at 483-86.
193 See  Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (noting that citi-
zens would be reluctant to let the government know they were reading material
deemed to be communist propaganda).  As noted in Part III, supra , the court in
People of the Territory of Guam v. Shymanovitz  stated:
To allow prosecutors to parade before the jury snippets from a defendant’s
library—the text of two magazine articles and descriptions of four
magazines—would compel all  persons to choose the contents of their li-
braries with considerable care; for it is the innocent, and not just the guilty,
who are sometimes the subject of good-faith prosecutions.
157 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 1998).  On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals discounted the chilling effect of evidentiary rulings. See supra  notes 134-44
and accompanying text.
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ment, what changes should be made?  Should protection of pro-
ducers be lessened or protection of consumers’ rights be
strengthened?  Given the near unanimity of courts in dismissing
civil suits against producers, a move toward producer liability
seems both unlikely and undesirable for the policy reasons stated
in opinions rejecting such suits.  The more realistic, and more de-
sirable, change would be to strengthen the protection of consum-
ers of expression when the state seeks to use their consumption
against them in a criminal trial.  Such a change could be accom-
plished by requiring a more rigorous showing of relevance.
The First Amendment does not erect a barrier to the admis-
sion of relevant evidence,194 but neither should it be completely
trodden underfoot whenever the state seeks to introduce evi-
dence of a defendant’s taste in books, movies, or music.  Where
such evidence is likely to be extremely prejudicial, as it will al-
ways be when the state seeks to tie violent entertainment to the
crime, courts should require more than a mere similarity between
the crimes depicted and the crime charged.  In addition, review-
ing courts should not give trial courts broad discretion to deter-
mine whether the defendant’s constitutional rights are affected;
constitutional issues should be reviewed de novo  as questions of
law.  Finally, courts should engage in harmless-error analysis
cautiously.
Where First Amendment rights are involved, the state or other
party seeking to overcome those rights usually has a heavy bur-
den of justification.195  A showing of relevance, on the other
hand, requires only a showing that the proffered evidence has
“any tendency  to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.”196  This defini-
tion involves two prongs, materiality and probative worth.197
Materiality means that the evidence goes to the existence of a
fact of consequence to the elements or defenses of the action.
The probative worth prong, “any tendency,” sets the bar very
low.198
194 Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 165 (1992).
195 See, e.g ., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
196 FED. R. EVID. 401 (emphasis added).  Most states have adopted a version of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
197 Nicolas, supra  note 9, at 540-41.
198 Id . at 541.
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If the constitutional issue is collapsed into an ordinary eviden-
tiary determination of relevance, giving the trial court wide dis-
cretion to determine relevance and resulting in a deferential
standard of review, the defendant consumer’s constitutional
rights are not adequately safeguarded.
It is true that when evidence is challenged under Dawson ,
lower courts have collapsed this issue so that the constitutional
question is treated as an evidentiary one.199  But, even if this
loose standard is appropriate under Dawson  for freedom of asso-
ciation arguments, the relevance of First Amendment consump-
tion habits is much harder to prove, or at least should be, than
the relevance of one’s associations, or even one’s own beliefs or
statements.  While we usually join groups because of some agree-
ment with their purpose or views, we often read, listen to, or
view materials we do not agree with or wish to emulate.  Any
asserted connection is too tenuous.  Curiosity may drive us to try
different materials, or we may hear or see things as part of social-
izing with others whose tastes are slightly different than ours.
The popularity of murder mysteries, across several forms of me-
dia, show that many law-abiding citizens like to read or watch
depictions of crimes that they will never commit. Prosecutors
may be tempted to think that what one reads or listens to signi-
fies one’s beliefs, but it just is not so.  Allowing courts to use
magic words such as “state of mind” or “motive” papers over this
lack of connection.
Because of the constitutional rights at stake—and because
there can be no assumption of a connection between reading,
watching, or listening habits and crime—before courts admit evi-
dence of a criminal defendant’s cultural consumption, there
should be a significant showing of relevance, such as the defen-
dant’s own statement linking the consumption to the crime.200  A
199 See supra  Part IV.
200 For example, in Byers v. Edmondson , 2001-1184 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/5/02), writ
denied , 2002-1811 (La. 10/4/02), 826 So. 2d 551 (La. Ct. App. 2002), the shooter
spoke about the influence of the movie on the crime.  Similar corroboration of rele-
vance might be found in evidence that the defendants modeled themselves on the
work, but there must be something more than evidence that the defendant liked the
particular work.  Many people like grisly movies or books.  Thus the defendant’s
statement in State v. Rizzo , 833 A.2d 363, 445 (Conn. 2003), that he was very inter-
ested in books and movies about Jeffrey Dahmer should probably not be sufficient
to show a connection between his taste and the crime charged.  But the defendant’s
statement that, like the heroes of Natural Born Killers , he’d like to “pull a fatality,”
might be sufficient.  See State v. Begay, 964 P.2d 102, 106 (N.M. 1998).
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mere similarity between the crime charged and the fictional or
depicted crime should not be enough.  Even a striking similarity
may not be enough with very popular works, for the fact that the
defendant listened to, watched, or read the work will not suffi-
ciently distinguish him or her from millions of other citizens.
Thus, there should be some other corroboration or link between
the work and the crime.
Perhaps courts should develop something like the Branden-
burg  incitement test for consumers.  Under that test for produc-
ers or speakers, the mere tendency of the work to cause crime is
not enough to remove it from First Amendment protection; its
creator must be shown to have intended it to incite imminent
lawless action.201  If this test were modified for consumers of ex-
pression, the mere tendency of the work to cause crime should
not make its consumption relevant in a criminal trial.  There must
be some clear evidence that the defendant viewed, listened to, or
read the work for inspiration, encouragement, or as a source of
ideas.  The fact that the defendant enjoyed the work is not
enough; many of us enjoy works about violence without then em-
ulating them.202
What if the defendant’s consumption habits are truly extreme?
That is, what if rather than owning or viewing a few violent, pop-
ular works, the defendant has an extensive collection of very vio-
lent materials?203  At some point, the extreme nature or sheer
volume of the defendant’s habits or tastes might justify a finding
of relevance even without other corroboration.  In such a case,
the question of what is truly extreme and linked to crime may be
a proper subject of expert testimony.204
The foregoing discussion deals mostly with the probative worth
prong of relevancy—whether the defendant’s viewing, reading,
or listening habits can be probative of the perpetrator’s identity,
a criminal mental state, or other element of the crime or defense.
However, relevancy also has a materiality prong which requires
201 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
202 This is true whether the evidence is offered to prove the defendant committed
the criminal act (to show identity) or to show an aggravating circumstance or to
increase the degree of the crime by showing, for example, premeditation.  The fact
that the defendant committed the act does not mean that his reading, viewing, or
listening habits elevated his mental state.
203 Such may have been the case in Dressler v. McCaughtry , 238 F.3d 908, 910 (7th
Cir. 2001), where the defendant had an extensive collection of videotapes and pho-
tographs of intentionally violent acts as well as of actual murder and mutilation.
204 See FED. R. EVID. 703.
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that the fact sought to be proved or disproved is material to the
action.205  If knowledge is an element of the crime, for example,
or, if the defendant seeks to show lack of knowledge, then evi-
dence that the defendant obtained knowledge through a book or
movie could well be relevant.206  However, such evidence may
not be offered simply to show the defendant’s propensity for vio-
lence.  Propensity is not a material fact.207
A court’s decision whether to admit consumption evidence
should also involve weighing its probative worth against the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.208
While this weighing is not part of the First Amendment inquiry,
which requires only that the evidence be relevant, it is an impor-
tant evidentiary point and vital to ensuring a fair trial.  A more
rigorous showing of relevance should ensure that the probative
worth is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.  Attorneys should ask for, and courts should perform,
a separate weighing.  Some books, movies, or music will be more
prejudicial than others, and there are usually a variety of ways to
present the evidence that will either maximize or minimize its
impact on the jury.209
Not only should the requirement of relevance for such evi-
dence be rigorous, but the standard of review should not be so
205 See  Nicolas, supra  note 9; see also FED. R. EVID. 401.
206 See  United States v. Walters, 351 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding evidence
that defendant had access to THE ANARCHIST’S COOKBOOK relevant to show knowl-
edge of bomb-making technique).
207 “Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.”
FED. R. EVID. 404(a).  However, “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” may
“be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” FED. R.
EVID. 404(b).  Sometimes consumption evidence is offered as “prior acts” evidence
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) or its state equivalent.  Courts differ as to
whether rule 404(b) even applies to this type of evidence. Compare Dressler , 238
F.3d at 913-14 (holding that possession of pornography and violent materials is a
“prior act” under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)) with  People of the Territory of
Guam v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that evidence
of defendant’s books and magazines is not evidence of an “act” under rule 404 (b)).
208 FED. R. EVID. 403 provides:  “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
209 One important question is whether to admit the movie, book, or song itself, or
whether to restrict the state to describing the work. See  Beasley v. State, 502 S.E.2d
235, 238 (Ga. 1998); see also supra  note 93 and accompanying text.  If the latter
course is followed, the content and extent of that description become issues.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-3\ORE301.txt unknown Seq: 42 12-APR-05 10:48
940 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
deferential to the trial court.  As a general rule, evidentiary deci-
sions are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
especially those aspects that involve the trial court’s fact-finding
expertise.210  But, where a constitutional right is involved, the de-
cision to admit evidence should be reviewed independently.211  If
this reasoning is applied to the issue of First Amendment con-
sumption evidence, reviewing courts should independently re-
view the factual record to see whether a finding of relevance is
really supported, and whether there is corroborating evidence of
a connection between the defendant’s consumption of entertain-
ment and the crime charged.  Certainly, reviewing courts should
defer to the trial court’s determinations of credibility and its
purely factual findings.212  But, as to the significance of those
facts, and whether they support an inference of motive, intent, or
state of mind, the appellate courts should conduct an indepen-
dent review.213  Because the determination of relevance of con-
210 See STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS
OF REVIEW § 11.01 (2d ed. 1992).  Professor Nicolas argues, however, that although
many courts recite that the admission or rejection of evidence is discretionary, in
practice the standard of review for evidentiary issues incorporates the traditional tri-
partite standard of de novo , clear error, and abuse of discretion.  Nicolas, supra  note
9, at 534-36.  To the extent a relevancy determination involves questions of law,
some courts will apply a de novo  standard of review. Id . at 541.
211 This was formerly the Supreme Court’s approach to evidentiary errors alleged
under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment:
[A]s with other fact-intensive, mixed questions of constitutional law . . .
“[i]ndependent review is . . . necessary . . . to maintain control of, and to
clarify, the legal principles” governing the factual circumstances necessary
to satisfy the protections of the Bill of Rights.  We, of course, accept the
Virginia courts’ determination that Mark’s statements were reliable for
purposes of state hearsay law, and, as should any appellate court, we re-
view the presence or absence of historical facts for clear error. But the
surrounding circumstances relevant to a Sixth Amendment admissibility
determination do not include the declarant’s in-court demeanor (otherwise
the declarant would be testifying) or any other factor uniquely suited to the
province of trial courts. For these reasons, when deciding whether the ad-
mission of a declarant’s out-of-court statements violates the Confrontation
Clause, courts should independently review whether the government’s
proffered guarantees of trustworthiness satisfy the demands of the Clause.
Lily v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 136-37 (1999) (plurality opinion) (internal citation
omitted).  The Court has since completely changed the framework for Confrontation
Clause analysis of out-of-court statements.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004).
212 See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra  note 211, § 11.04. R
213 See  Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (holding that when re-
viewing reasonable suspicion or probable cause determination, court should review
the determination of historical facts for clear error, but independently review the
ultimate determination).
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sumption evidence ultimately determines whether the
consumer’s First Amendment rights have been violated, the find-
ing of relevance should be reviewed independently.
Such an approach is supported by the Supreme Court’s review
of other issues involving the First Amendment.214  “The simple
fact is that First Amendment questions of ‘constitutional fact’
compel this Court’s de novo  review.”215  The reviewing court will
conduct an independent review of trial court determinations of
“obscenity,” “actual malice,” and other findings of constitutional
significance: “[T]he rule is that we ‘examine for ourselves the
statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were
made to see . . . whether they are of a character which the princi-
ples of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect.’”216  Similarly,
where a finding of relevance establishes the extent of First
Amendment protection, the reviewing court should conduct an
independent appellate review of that finding.  Such an approach
will also aid in the development of a consistent body of law with
respect to First Amendment consumer evidence.217
Finally, as part of reviewing errors on appeal, courts should
apply a harmless-error standard appropriate for constitutional
errors: harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.218  As Justice Black-
mun noted in Dawson , there is an argument against applying any
harmless error analysis to this kind of error.219  Such an argu-
ment is unlikely to prevail today; harmless error analysis, espe-
cially for constitutional errors deemed trial errors rather than
structural, is well-established.220  But, if such an analysis is to be
used, it should be done cautiously; simply referring to the evi-
dence remaining as overwhelming tends to discount the prejudi-
cial effect the erroneously admitted evidence may have had.221
A better inquiry is whether the state can prove “beyond a rea-
214 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 500
(1984).
215 Bose , 466 U.S. at 508 n.27.
216 Id . at 508 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946)).
217 See  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436
(2001).
218 See  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
219 Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 169 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
220 See  Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279 (1991).
221 See Chapman , 386 U.S. at 23; Williams v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d 166, 169
(Va. Ct. App. 2000).
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sonable doubt that the [erroneous admission of evidence] did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.”222  Such an inquiry allows the
reviewing court to carefully consider the prejudicial nature of the
improper evidence.  Many of the decisions reviewed in Part III of
this Article are quite cursory in their harmless-error analyses.
Appellate defense attorneys should do their best to ensure a
more thorough harmless-error review.
As a practical matter, it is up to defense attorneys to raise the
constitutional challenge to consumption evidence, to argue for a
rigorous showing of relevance, and to urge a less deferential stan-
dard of review.  In our adversarial system, courts will not do the
work of the advocate.
Arguably, the real reason for the difference between the treat-
ment of producers and consumers is poor lawyering.  Any com-
parison between the treatment of producers’ rights in the civil
context and that of consumers’ rights in criminal trials must take
account of the disparity in legal resources between the typical
entertainment defendant and the typical criminal defendant.  En-
tertainment defendants are chosen in part for their deep pockets,
and the number and kind of defense attorneys listed in the deci-
sions reflect that wealth.  The majority of criminal defendants are
indigent, represented by appointed counsel who are very often
overworked and underpaid.  The lengthy discussions of the First
Amendment in suits against producers are probably due to ex-
tensive briefing of the issues, while the First Amendment is
rarely raised in the first place by criminal defendants challenging
consumption evidence.  This disparity of resources is an unfortu-
nate reality, and may explain in part why the law has developed
as it has.  Certainly, better lawyering, beginning with timely and
accurate objections, could go far toward changing the outcome
with respect to consumption evidence in criminal trials.  It is the
author’s hope that this Article will help to alert defense counsel
to the First Amendment issues at stake.
Lawyers and courts need to take seriously the issue of consum-
ers’ rights under the First Amendment for several reasons.  First,
there is the untenable disparity in how producers and consumers
of cultural products are treated, even though the Constitution
protects both producers and consumers of expression.  Second,
there is the very real danger of wrongful convictions based on
inflammatory music, films, and other media.  Where criminal de-
222 Chapman , 386 U.S. at 24.
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fendants come from backgrounds different from that of their ju-
rors, this cultural divide can often be widened by violent imagery
or words in works the defendant has consumed.  DNA testing in
old cases has shown that wrongful convictions occur.223  DNA ev-
idence is not always available, however, so the danger of wrong-
ful conviction remains very real.  This danger should not be
increased with inflammatory, irrelevant evidence of the defen-
dant’s taste in music, movies, or books.
Last, we should be concerned about the potential chilling ef-
fect on the exercise of our constitutional right to read, watch, or
listen to what we wish.  The criminal trial of a man accused of
murder may seem far away from our own trip to the video store
or library.  But, as our consumption habits are increasingly
tracked, both by government and private entities, each of us
leaves a record that could be mined for different purposes.  A
loose approach to relevance in the criminal context opens the
door to using the information in other contexts, and could begin
to make us all more fearful of creating a record of looking at,
listening to, or reading the wrong kind of material.
223 See  The Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, at
http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
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